Puzzles v/s Mysteries

Posted May 31st, 2007 by

There’s a nice article at the Smithsonian about the difference between riddles and mysteries. I received this via the security metrics email list.

Risks and Riddles

This reminds me of intelligence work, for obvious reasons.

There are 2 major types of offensive actions an army can conduct: deliberate attack and movement to contact. (Yes, those of you pedantic enough will bring up hasty attacks and a dozen other scenarios, I’m being a generalist here =) )

In a deliberate attack, you know roughly what the Bad Guys are doing–they are defending key terrain. The task for the intelligence people is to find specific Bad Guy battle positions down the the platoon level. This is a puzzle with a fairly established framework, you are interested in the details.

In a movement to contact, you have a very hazy idea that there are Bad Guys out there. You move with an eye towards retaining flexibility so that you can develop the situation based on what you learn during the mission. The task for the intelligence people is to determine the overall trend on what the Bad Guys are doing. This is a mystery, and you’re more concerned with finding out the overall direction than you are with the specifics–they’ll get lost due to “friction” anyway.

Now translated to information security, there is some of what we know about the Bad Guys that is static and therefore more of a puzzle–think about threats that have mature technologies like firewalls, Anti-virus, etc to counter them. Solutions to these threats are all about products.

On the other hand, we have the mysteries: 0-day attacks, covert channels, and the ever-popular insider threat. Just like a well-established military has problems understanding the mystery that is movement to contact, information security practitioners have problems responding to threats that have not been well-defined.

So information security, viewed in the light of puzzle v/s mystery becomes the following scenario: how much time, effort, and money do we spend on the puzzles versus how much time do we spend on mysteries? The risk geek in me wants to sit down and determine probabilities, rate of occurance, etc in order to make the all-important cost-benefit-risk comparison. But for mysteries I can’t, by definition of what a mystery is, do that, and our model goes back to peddling voodoo to the business consumers.

Similar Posts:

Posted in Army, Rants, Risk Management, What Doesn't Work, What Works | 1 Comment »

One Response

  1.  Puzzles, Mysteries, & The Giant Ball Of String | RiskAnalys.is Says:

    […] then points us to his excellent post on Puzzles & Mysteries.   In it, the “that” which “we don’t know about yet” he describes: […]

Leave a Comment

Please note: Comment moderation is enabled and may delay your comment. There is no need to resubmit your comment.

Visitor Geolocationing Widget: