I’m on the OWASP Podcast

Posted October 1st, 2009 by rybolov

I sat down with Jim Manico a month or so ago when he was in DC and recorded a podcast for the OWASP Podcast.  It’s now live, check it out.

Posted in FISMA, NIST, Public Policy, Rants, Speaking, The Guerilla CISO | No Comments »
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The CyberArmy You Have…

Posted July 27th, 2009 by rybolov

In the military, there is a saying: “You go to war with the army you have, not with the army you wish you had.”  In other words, you do all your training in peace and once you go off to war, it’s too late to fix it. Not that I agree with all the Cyber Pearl Harbor doomsayers, but I think that the CyberArmy we got now isn’t the right one for the job.

So, let’s talk about services firms, contractors fit into this nicely since, well, they perform services.

There are 4 types of work that services firms do (and contractors are services firms):

  • Brains: nobody else has done this before, but we hire a whole bunch of PhD people who can research how to get this done.  We charge really high prices but it’s because in the downtime, our people are doing presentations, going to symposiums, and working on things that you don’t even know exist.  Think old-school L0pht.  Think half of Mitre.  Think sharks with friggin laser beams, lasing and eating everything in sight.
  • Gray Hair: We’ve done this before and know most of the problems that we can experience, along with the battle scars to prove it.  We charge quite a bit because we’re good and it takes less of us to get it done than our competitors.  Think most good IT engineers.  Think DLP and DAM right now.  Think infantry platoon sergeants.
  • Procedural: There is a fairly sizeable market starting to grow around this service so we have to standardize quite a bit to reduce our costs to provide the service.  We use methodologies and tools so that we can take an army of trained college graduates, put them in a project, and they can execute according to plan.  Think audit staff.  Think help desk staff.  Think of an efficient DMV.
  • Commodity: There isn’t a differentiator between competitors, so companies compete on price.  The way you make money is by making your cost of production lower or selling in volume.  Think Anti-Virus software (sorry friends, it’s true).  Think security guards.  Think peanut butter.

This is also the maturity model for technology, so you can take any kind of tech, drop it in at the top, and it percolates down to the bottom.  Think Internet use: First it was the academics, then the contractors, then the technology early adopters on CompuServe, then free Internet access to all.  For most technology, it’s a 5-10 year cycle to get from the top to the bottom.  You already know this: the skills you have now will be obsolete in 5 years.

Procedural Permit Required photo by Dawn Endico.

Now looking at government contracting….

As a government contractor, you are audited financially by DCAA and they add up all your costs and let you keep a fixed margin of around 13-20%.  You can pull some Stupid Contractor Tricks ™ like paying salaries and working your people 60 hours/week (this is called uncompensated overtime), but there still is a limit to what you can do.

This fixed margin forces you into high-volume work to turn a profit.  This in turn forces you into procedural or even commodity work.

If your project is strictly time and material, you make more money off the cheaper folks but for quality of work reasons, you have to provide them with a playbook of some sort.  This pushes you directly into the procedural tier.

There are some contractors providing services at the Brains and Gray Hair stages, only they are few and far between.

Traditional types of contractor security services:

  • Security Program Management and Governance
  • Audit and Penetration Testing
  • Compliance and Certification and Accreditation Support
  • Security Operations (think Managed Security Services)

Then back around to cyberwar…

Cyberwar right now is definitely at the top of the skill hierarchy.  We don’t have an official national strategy.  We have a Cybersecurity Coordinator that hasn’t been filled yet.  We need Brains people and their skills to figure this out.  In fact, we have a leadership drought.

And yet the existing contractor skillset is based on procedural offerings.  To be honest, I see lots of people with cybersecurity offerings, but what they really have is rebranded service offerings because the skills sets of the workforce haven’t changed.

Some of the procedural offerings work, but only if you keep them in limited scope.  The security operations folks have quite a few tranferable skills, so do the pen-testers.  However, these are all at the tactical level.  The managerial skills don’t transfer really at all unless you have people that are just well-rounded, usually with some kind of IT ops background.

But, and this is the important thing, we’re not ready to hire contractors until we do get some leadership in place. And that’s why the $25M question right now is “Who will that person be?”  Until that time, anything from the vendors and contractors is just posturing.

Once we get a national leadership and direction, then it’s a matter of lining up the services being offered with the needs at the time.  What I think we’ll find out at that time is that we’re grossly underrepresented in some areas and sadly underrepresented in some areas and that these areas are directly inverse to the skills that our current workforce has.  This part scares me.

We need workforce development.  There are some problems with this, mostly because it takes so long to “grow” somebody with the skills to get the job done–maybe 5-10 years with education and experience.  Sadly, about the time we build this workforce, the problem will have slid down the scale so that procedural offerings will probably work.  This frustrates me greatly.

The summary part…

Well, just like I don’t want to belong to any club that would stoop so low to have me as a member, it could be possible that almost all the contractors offering services aren’t the people that you want to hire for the job.

But then again, we need to figure out the leadership part first.  Sadly, that’s where we need the most love.  It’s been how many months with a significant leadership vacuum?  9? 12? 7 years?

The most critical step in building a cyberwar/cyberdefense/cyberfoo capability is in building a workforce.  We’re still stuck with the “option” of building the airplane while it’s taxiing down the runway.

Posted in Cyberwar, Rants | 6 Comments »
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Surprise Report: Not Enough Security Staff

Posted July 22nd, 2009 by rybolov

Somedays I feel like people are reading this blog and getting ideas that they turn around and steal.  Then I take my pills and my semi-narcisistic feelings go away.  =)

So anyway, B|A|H threw me for a loop this afternoon.  They released a report on the cybersecurity workforce.  You can check out the article on The Register or you can go get the report from here.  Surprise, we don’t have anywhere near enough security people to go around.  I’ve been saying this for years, I think B|A|H is stealing my ideas by using Van Eck phreaking on my brain while I sleep.

 Some revelations from the executive summary:

  • The pipeline of potential new talent is inadequate.  In other words, demand is growing and the amount of people that we’re training is not growing to meet the demand.
  • Fragmented governance and uncoordinated leadership hinders the ability to meet federal cybersecurity workforce needs.  Nobody’s so far been able to articulate how we build an adequate supply of security folks to keep up with demand and most of our efforts have been at the execution level.
  • Complicated processes and rules hamper recruiting and retention efforts.  It takes maybe 6 months to hire a government employee, this is entirely unsatisfactory.  My current project I was cleared for for 3 years, took a 9-month break, and it took me 6 months to get cleared again.
  • There is a disconnect between front-line hiring managers and government’s HR specialists.  Since the HR folks don’t know what the real job description is, hiring information security people is akin to buzzword bingo.

These are all the same problems the private sector deals with, only in true Government stylie, we have it on a larger scale.

 

He’s Part of the Workforce photo by pfig.

Now for the things that no self-respecting contractor will admit (hmm, what does this say about me?  I’m not sure yet)….

If you do not have an adequate supply of workers in the industry, outsourcing cybersecurity tasks to contractors will not work.  It works something like this:

  • High Demand = High Bill Rate.
  • High Bill Rate = More Contractor Interest
  • More Contractor Interest + High Bill Rate +  Low Supply = High Rate of Charlatans

Contractors do not have the labor pool to tap into to satisfy their contracts.  If you want to put on your cynic hat (all the Guerilla-CISO staff have theirs permanently attached with wood screws), you could say that the B|A|H report was trying to get the Government to pump more money into workforce development so that they could then hire those people and bill them back to the Government.  It’s a twisted world, folks.

Current contractor labor pools have some of the skills necessary for cybersecurity but not all.  More info in future blog posts, but I think a simple way to summarize it is to say that our current workforce is “tooled” around IT security compliance and that we are lacking in large-scale attack and defense skills.

Not only do we need more people in the security industry, but we need more security people in Government.  There is a set of tasks called “inherent government functions” that cannot be delegated to contractors.  Even if you solely increase the contractor headcount, you still have to increase the government employee headcount in order to manage the contractors.

Posted in Outsourcing, Public Policy | 9 Comments »
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LOLCATS, CISOs, and Horror Stories

Posted July 9th, 2009 by rybolov

Sometimes it takes a little bit of dramatization to get the funding for your security program. Here at IKANHAZFIZMA, well, maybe we take it a bit too far.

funny pictures

Posted in IKANHAZFIZMA | 2 Comments »
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IKANHAZFIZMA’s take on Security Appliances

Posted June 25th, 2009 by rybolov

Why sell security software when you can bundle it with pre-installed hardware and operating system and sell it as an appliance?  We took some of our best lolcats and put them to work building us something we could “productize” and this is what they came up with….

funny pictures

Posted in IKANHAZFIZMA | No Comments »
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A Short History of Cyberwar Lookalikes

Posted June 17th, 2009 by rybolov

Rybolov’s Note: Hello all, I’m venturing into an open-ended series of blog posts aimed at starting conversation. Note that I’m not selling anything *yet* but ideas and maybe some points for discussion.

Let’s get this out there from the very beginning: I agree with Ranum that full-scale, nation-v/s-nation Cyberwar is not a reality.  Not yet anyway, and hopefully it never will be.  However, on a smaller scale with well-defined objectives, cyberwar is not only happening now, but it is also a natural progression over the past century.

DojoSec Monthly Briefings – March 2009 – Marcus J. Ranum from Marcus Carey on Vimeo.

Looking at where we’re coming from in the existing models and techniques for activities similar to cyberwar, it frames our present state very nicely :

Electronic Countermeasures. This has been happening for some time.  The first recorded use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) was in 1905 when the Russians tried to jam radio signals of the Japananese fleet besieging Port Arthur.  If you think about ECM as DOS based on radio, sonar, etc, then it seems like cyberwar is just an extension of the same denial of communications that we’ve been doing since communication was “invented”.

Modern Tactical Collection and Jamming. This is where Ranum’s point about spies and soldiers falls apart, mostly because we don’t have clandestine operators doing electronic collection at the tactical level–they’re doing both collection and “attack”.  The typical battle flow goes something along the lines of scanning for items of interest, collecting on a specific target, then jamming once hostilities have begun.  Doctrinally, collection is called Electronic Support and jamming is called Electronic Attack.  What you can expect in a cyberwar is a period of reconnaissance and surveillance for an extended length of time followed by “direct action” during other “kinetic” hostilities.

Radio Station Jamming. This is a wonderful little world that most of you never knew existed.  The Warsaw Pact used to jam Radio America and other sorts of fun propaganda that we would send at them.  Apparently we’ve had some interesting radio jamming since the end of the Cold War, with China, Cuba, North Korea, and South Korea implicated in some degree or another.

Website Denial-of-Service. Since only old people listen to radio anymore and most news is on the Internet, so it makes sense to DOS news sites with an opposing viewpoint.  This happens all the time, with attacks ranging from script kiddies doing ping floods to massive DOSBots and some kind of racketeering action… “You got a nice website, it would be pretty bad if nobody could see it.”  Makes me wonder why the US hasn’t taken Al Jazeera off the Internet.  Oh, that’s right, somebody already tried it.  However, in my mind, jamming something like Al Jazeera is very comparable to jamming Voice of America.

Estonia and Gruzija DOS. These worked pretty well from a denial-of-communications standpoint, but only because of the size of the target.  And so what if it did block the Internet, when it comes to military forces, it’s at best an annoyance, at most it will slow you down just enough.  Going back to radio jamming, blocking out a signal only works when you have more network to throw at the target than the target has network to communicate with the other end.  Believe it or not, there are calculators to determine this.

Given this evolution of communications denial, it’s not unthinkable that people wouldn’t be launching electronic attacks at each other via radar, radio, carrier pigeon, IP or any other way they can.

However, as in the previous precedents and more to some of the points of Ranum’s talk at DojoSec, electronic attacks by themselves only achieve limited objectives.  Typically the most likely type of attack is to conduct a physical attack and use the electronic attack, whether it’s radio, radar, or IT assets, to delay the enemy’s response.  This is why you have to take an electronic attack seriously if it’s being launched by a country which has a military capable of attacking you physically–it might be just a jamming attack, it might be a precursor to an invasion.

Bottom line here is this: if you use it for communication, it’s a target and has been for some time.

Posted in Technical, The Guerilla CISO, What Doesn't Work, What Works | 5 Comments »
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