The Spanish Civil War and the Rise of Cyberwar

Posted June 22nd, 2009 by

As usual, I greatly enjoyed your blog from 17 June, A Short History of Cyberwar Look-alikes, Rybolov. Moreover I really appreciated your historical examples. It warms my heart whenever an American uses the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/5 as a historic example of anything. Most Americans have never even heard of it. Yet, it is important event today if for no other reason than it established the tradition of having the US President intercede as a peace negotiator and win the Nobel Prize for Peace for his efforts. Because of this, some historians mark it as the historic point at which the US entered the world stage as a great power. By the way the President involved was Teddy Roosevelt.

Concerning the state and nature of Cyberwar today, I’ve seen Rybolov’s models and I think they make sense. Cyberwar as an extension of electronic warfare makes some sense. The analogy does break down at some point because of the peculiarity of the medium. For example, when considering exploitation of SCADA systems as we have seen in the Baltic States and in a less focused manner here in North America, it is hard to see a clear analogy in electronic warfare. The consequences look more like old-fashion kinetic warfare. Likewise, there are aspects of Cyberwarfare that look like good old-fashion human intelligence and espionage. Of course I also have reservations with the electronic warfare model based on government politics. Our friends at NSA have been suggesting that Cyberwarfare is an extension of signals intelligence for years, with the accompanying claim that they (NSA) should have the technical, legal, and of course budgetary resources that go along with it.

I’ve also have seen other writers propose other models of Cyberwarfare and they tend to be a mixed bag at best. At worst, many of the models proposed appear to be the laughable writings of individuals with no more insight to or knowledge of intelligence operations beyond the latest James Bond movie. My own opinion is that two models or driving forces behind international Cyberwarfare activity. The first is pure opportunism. Governments and criminal organizations alike, even authoritarian governments have seen the Hollywood myths and the media hysteria about hacker exploits. Over time, criminal gangs have created and expanded on their cyber capabilities driven by a calculation of profits and risks much like conventional businesses. Combine an international banking environment that allows funds to be transferred across borders with little effort and less time and an international legal environment that is largely out of touch with the Internet and international telecommunications, and we have a breeding ground for Cyber criminals in which the risks of cross-border criminal activity is often much less risky than domestic criminal activity.

As successful Cyber criminal gangs have emerged in totalitarian regimes, it shouldn’t be a surprise that eventually the governments involved would eventually take an interest in both their activities and techniques. There are several reasons that totalitarian government might want to do this. Perhaps the simplest motivation is that the corrupt officials would be drawn to share in the profits in exchange for protection. In addition, the intelligence arms of these nations could also leverage their services and techniques at a fraction of the cost of developing similar capabilities themselves. Additionally, using these capabilities would also provide the intelligence agencies and even the host government with an element of deniability if operations assigned to the criminal gangs were detected.

Monument to the International Brigade photo by Secret Pilgrim.  For more information, read the history of the International Brigade.

Perhaps the most interesting model of development and Cyberwarfare activity today would be based on the pre-WW II example of the Spanish Civil War. After World War I, a period of mental and societal exhaustion followed on the part of all participating nations. This was quickly follow by a period of self-assessment and rebuilding. In the case of the defeated Germany the reconstruction period protracted due to difficult economic conditions, in part created by the harsh conditions of surrender imposed by the winning European governments.

It was also important to remember that these same victorious European governments undermined many of social and moral underpinnings of German society by systematically all the basis of traditional German government and governmental legitimacy without regard for what should replace it. The assessments of most historians is that these factors combined to sow the seed of hatred against the victorious powers and created a social climate in which a return to open warfare at some time in the future was seen as unavoidable and perhaps desirable. The result was that Germany actively prepared and planned for what was seen as the commonly inevitable war in the future. New systems and technologies were considered, tested. However, treaty limitations also hampered some of these efforts.

In the Soviet Union a similar set of conclusions developed during this period of history within the ruling elite, specifically that renewed war with Germany was inevitable in the near term. Like Germany, the Soviet Union also actively prepared for this war. Likewise they considered and studied new technologies and approaches to war. Somewhat surprisingly, they also secretly conspired with the Germans to provide them with secret proving grounds and test facilities to study some to the new technologies and approaches to war that would otherwise have been banned under provisions of the peace treaties of World War I.

So, when Civil War broke out in Spain in the summer of 1936, both Germany and the Soviet Union were positively delirious at the prospects of testing their new military equipment and theories out under battlefield conditions but, without the risks of participating in a real shooting war as an active belligerent. So, both governments sent every military technology possible to their proxies in Spain under the auspices of “aid”. In some cases they even sent “advisors” who were nothing less than active soldiers and pilots in the conflict. At first, this activity took place under a shroud of secrecy. But, when you send military equipment and people to fight in foreign lands it usually takes no time at all for someone to notice that, “those guys aren’t from here”.

Bomber During the Spanish Civil War photo by -Merce-.  Military aviation, bombing in particular, was one of the new technologies that was tested during the Spanish Civil War.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, I think the world has looked at the United States as the world’s sole superpower. Many, view this situation with fear and suspicion. Even some of our former Cold War allies have taken this view. Certainly our primary Cold War adversaries have adopted this stance. If you look at contemporary Chinese and Russian military writing it is clear that they have adopted a position similar to the pre- World War II notion that war between the US and Russia or war between the US and China is inevitable. To make matters worse, during much of the Cold War the US never seemed to pull it together militarily long enough to actually win a war. Toward the end of the Cold War we started smacking smaller allies of the Soviet Union like Grenada and succeeded.

We then moved on to give Iraq a real drubbing after the Cold War. The so-call “Hyperwar” in Iraq terrified the Russians and Chinese alike. The more they studied what we did in Iraq the more terrified they became. On of the many counters they have written about is posing asymmetric threats to the US, that is to say threatening the US in a way in which it is uniquely, or unusually vulnerable. One of these areas of vulnerability is Cyberspace. All sorts of press reporting indicate that the Russians and Chinese have made significant investments in this area. The Russians and Chinese deny these reports as quickly as they emerge. So, it is difficult to determine what the truth is. The fact that the Russians and Chinese are so sensitive to these claims may be a clear indication that they have active programs – the guilty men in these cases have a clear record of protesting to much when they are most guilty.

Assuming that all of this post-Cold War activity is true, I believe this puts us in much the same situation that existed in the pre-World War II Spanish Civil War era. I think the Russian and Chinese governments are just itching to test and refine their Cyberwarfare capabilities. But, at the same time I think they want to operate in a manner similar to how the Germans and the Soviet Union operated in that conflict. I think they want and are testing their capabilities but in a limited way that provides them with some deniability and diplomatic cover. This is important to them because the last thing they want now is to create a Cyber-incident that will precipitate a general conflict or even a major shift in diplomatic or trade relationships.

One of the major differences between the Spanish Civil War example and our current situation of course is that there is no need for a physical battlefield to exist to provide as a live testing environment for Cyber weapons and techniques. However, at least in the case of Russia with respect to Georgia, they are exploiting open military conflicts to use Cyberwar techniques when those conflicts do arise. We have seen similar, but much smaller efforts on the part of Iran, and the Palestinian Authority as embrace what is seen as a cheap and low risk weapon. However, their efforts seem to be more reactionary and rudimentary. The point is, the longer this game goes on without serious consequence the more it will escalate both vertically (in sophistication) and horizontally (be embraced by more countries). Where all of this will lead is anyone guess. But, I think the safe money is betting that the concept of Cyberwar is here to stay and eventually the tools and techniques and full potential of Cyberwar will eventually be used as part of as part of a strategy including more traditional weapons and techniques.



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A Short History of Cyberwar Lookalikes

Posted June 17th, 2009 by

Rybolov’s Note: Hello all, I’m venturing into an open-ended series of blog posts aimed at starting conversation. Note that I’m not selling anything *yet* but ideas and maybe some points for discussion.

Let’s get this out there from the very beginning: I agree with Ranum that full-scale, nation-v/s-nation Cyberwar is not a reality.  Not yet anyway, and hopefully it never will be.  However, on a smaller scale with well-defined objectives, cyberwar is not only happening now, but it is also a natural progression over the past century.

DojoSec Monthly Briefings – March 2009 – Marcus J. Ranum from Marcus Carey on Vimeo.

Looking at where we’re coming from in the existing models and techniques for activities similar to cyberwar, it frames our present state very nicely :

Electronic Countermeasures. This has been happening for some time.  The first recorded use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) was in 1905 when the Russians tried to jam radio signals of the Japananese fleet besieging Port Arthur.  If you think about ECM as DOS based on radio, sonar, etc, then it seems like cyberwar is just an extension of the same denial of communications that we’ve been doing since communication was “invented”.

Modern Tactical Collection and Jamming. This is where Ranum’s point about spies and soldiers falls apart, mostly because we don’t have clandestine operators doing electronic collection at the tactical level–they’re doing both collection and “attack”.  The typical battle flow goes something along the lines of scanning for items of interest, collecting on a specific target, then jamming once hostilities have begun.  Doctrinally, collection is called Electronic Support and jamming is called Electronic Attack.  What you can expect in a cyberwar is a period of reconnaissance and surveillance for an extended length of time followed by “direct action” during other “kinetic” hostilities.

Radio Station Jamming. This is a wonderful little world that most of you never knew existed.  The Warsaw Pact used to jam Radio America and other sorts of fun propaganda that we would send at them.  Apparently we’ve had some interesting radio jamming since the end of the Cold War, with China, Cuba, North Korea, and South Korea implicated in some degree or another.

Website Denial-of-Service. Since only old people listen to radio anymore and most news is on the Internet, so it makes sense to DOS news sites with an opposing viewpoint.  This happens all the time, with attacks ranging from script kiddies doing ping floods to massive DOSBots and some kind of racketeering action… “You got a nice website, it would be pretty bad if nobody could see it.”  Makes me wonder why the US hasn’t taken Al Jazeera off the Internet.  Oh, that’s right, somebody already tried it.  However, in my mind, jamming something like Al Jazeera is very comparable to jamming Voice of America.

Estonia and Gruzija DOS. These worked pretty well from a denial-of-communications standpoint, but only because of the size of the target.  And so what if it did block the Internet, when it comes to military forces, it’s at best an annoyance, at most it will slow you down just enough.  Going back to radio jamming, blocking out a signal only works when you have more network to throw at the target than the target has network to communicate with the other end.  Believe it or not, there are calculators to determine this.

Given this evolution of communications denial, it’s not unthinkable that people wouldn’t be launching electronic attacks at each other via radar, radio, carrier pigeon, IP or any other way they can.

However, as in the previous precedents and more to some of the points of Ranum’s talk at DojoSec, electronic attacks by themselves only achieve limited objectives.  Typically the most likely type of attack is to conduct a physical attack and use the electronic attack, whether it’s radio, radar, or IT assets, to delay the enemy’s response.  This is why you have to take an electronic attack seriously if it’s being launched by a country which has a military capable of attacking you physically–it might be just a jamming attack, it might be a precursor to an invasion.

Bottom line here is this: if you use it for communication, it’s a target and has been for some time.



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Preparing for Cybergeddon

Posted May 7th, 2009 by

Infantrymen have this crude-but-effective method of unarmed combat known as “Combatives”.  It’s a small stretch to envision our cyber-warriors practicing their own brand of cyber-combatives.

This lolcat is almost dedicated to our security twit/bloggers and jiu-jitsu fiends Chris Hoff and Jeremiah Grossman.

funny pictures



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Cyber Command Goes LOLCATS

Posted May 22nd, 2008 by

USAF Cyber Command:  We don’t know what our mission is, much less our organization or where we’re going to find lots of smart geeks who don’t mind being E-1s.  We have some really good commercials, though.  =)

But hey, that’s why it’s still “Provisional”.

funny pictures



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Current Government Security Initiatives

Posted May 5th, 2008 by

In building slides for our ongoing NIST Framework for FISMA class, I put together a deck of the ongoing Government security initiatives.  It’s plenty of stuff to keep you busy.

Government Security System

“Government Security System” Photo by Kahala

These are some of the more interesting initiatives and a brief description of them:

President’s Management Agenda Scorecard:  This is a quarterly red-yellow-green (hmm, wonder why nobody but the military uses black-red-yellow-green) scorecard on the various aspects of the agenda.  Security is represented as some of the values behind the E-Government score.  More specifically, OMB calls out the following in their FISMA report to congress:

To “get to green” under the E-Government scorecard, agencies must meet the following 3 security criteria:

  • IG or Agency Head verifies effectiveness of the Department-wide IT security remediation process. (rybolov: Plans of Actions and Milestones)
  • IG or Agency Head rates the agency C&A process as “Satisfactory” or better.
  • The agency has 90 percent of all IT systems properly secured (certified and accredited). (rybolov: C&A does not always equate to “secured”, but is an indicator)

In order to “maintain green,” by July 1, 2008, agencies must meet the following security and privacy criteria:

  1. All systems certified and accredited. (rybolov: same C&A caveat as before)
  2. Systems installed and maintained in accordance with security configurations. (rybolov: lots of wiggle room here since it’s the agency’s standard except for the Federal Desktop Core Configuration)
  3. Has demonstrated for 90 Percent of applicable systems a PIA has been conducted and is publicly posted. (rybolov:  PIA is a Privacy Impact Assessment.  It gets posted in the Federal Register as a public notification of what the Government is collecting and what the use is)
  4. Has demonstrated for 90 percent of systems with PII contained in a system of records covered by the Privacy Act to have developed, published, and maintained a current SORN. (rybolov: System of Record Notice, this is what is filed with the Federal Register)
  5. Has an agreed-upon plan to meet communication requirements for COOP and COG. (rybolov: Continuity of Government)

You can view the current scorecard and learn more about it at results.gov.

OMB Management Watch List:  This is a list of “at-risk” projects.  Security is one part of the list of risks, but for the most part this is a list of high-risk projects within the context of a program/project manager.  The security criteria for being on the Watch List are based on on IG assessments of:

  • Certification and Accreditation
  • Plan of Actions and Milestones
  • Privacy Impact Assessment

 You can check out the most recent Watch List at OMB’s website.

Combined Catalog of Controls:  Superseding DoDI 8500.2 (DoD catalog of controls) and DCID 6/3 (intelligence community catalog of controls) with a reinforced SP 800-53.  Process flow would be along SP 800-37.  I’ve talked about this before.

Security Line of Business:  Agencies become subject-matter experts in an area and become a contractor to the other agencies.  Not a new concept, we’ve seen it elsewhere.

Privacy Management:  OMB Memo 07-16 lays out a privacy plan containing the following tenets:

  • Breach Notification:  Requires each agency to have a breach notification policy
  • SSN Reduction:  Each agency reduces the use of Social Security Numbers where not needed
  • PII Reduction:  Restrict the collection of PII where not needed
  • Rules of Behavior:  Rules for employees to follow when they deal with PII

SCAP and FDCC:  I’ve covered these in much detail. 

Trusted Internet Connections: This is a plan to reduce the number of Government internet connections to 50.  Even the most ardent OMB supporters have to agree that this is both a fairly arbitrary number, not achiveable in the next several years, and not even really a good idea.  You heard it here first, folks, but conventional wisdom says that 500 is a better, more realistic number for the time being, and that is the “real” number that OMB is considering.  The start of this is OMB Memo 08-05.

Einstein:  Basically a Government-wide IDS and SIEM run by US-CERT.  It’s offered under the Security Line of Business.  The good thing about Einstein is that it allows DHS to correllate events government-wide.

Air Force Cyber Command:  It’s provisional now, doesn’t have a permanent headquarters, and is trying to figure out what its mission is, but it’s here.  Gossip around town is that it’s focused on both defensive and offensive missions, although they pictures are all defensive-based.  There’s some information on their website, but be sure to read between the lines.  =)

Cyber Corps:  Scholarship program for college students (both post-grad and undergrad) with a public service obligation following graduation.  You can find out more here.

SmartBuy:  A GSA-run program to bulk-purchase commercial off-the-shelf software at a high-volume discount.  Think of it as a buyer’s club for software.  SmartBuy has disk-encryption software.  You can get more information on the GSA website.



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